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(Culture, Identization  and Integration) 
Motto 
 
“Identification processes have been gradually transferred from the outside of 
society to its interior. From entities that are transcendent and metaphysical, 
from metasocial foundations such as myths, gods, ancestors, but also from the 
more recent avatars of God such as History or the Invisible Hand of the 
market, identification processes shift to associative human action, to culture, 
communication and social relations. As identity is progressively recognized as 
socially produced, it becomes obvious that notions like coherence, limit 
maintenance, and recognition only describe it in static terms; in its dynamic 
connotation, however, collective identity increasingly becomes a process of 
construction and autonomization. (…) The collective actor tends to construct 
its coherence and recognize itself within the limits set by the environment and 
social relations. Collective identity tends to coincide with conscious processes 
of ‘organization’ and it is experienced not so much as a situation as it is an 
action. To express increasingly self-reflexive and constructed manner in which 
contemporary collective actors tend to define themselves, I suggest using the 




Most of contemporary individual and social identities (constructed with societal, 
cultural and technological resources) are radically autonomous, nomadic and virtual – 
i.e. they are de-traditionalized, open to negotiation and not based on a single 
interpretation of a tradition. Identizations can be recycled - elements of former 
identities are being re-used in constructing later ones or identities emerging in one 
context can be implanted in another or hybridised – a nation state as a model for 
socio-political identity is a case in point (and so is its recent crisis). Values, political, 
cultural and social identities - elective identities of “nomads of the present”, often 
emerging out of new social movements or informal networks - play an important role 
in determining choices of information codes, images and identities. Theories of 
clashes of civilizations and of fundamentalists versus modernists should be seen 
against the background of increasingly complex and successful attempts at global 
governance and increasing criticism of the ideologies of status quo. They may testify 
to the success of globalization instead of demonstrating its failure. The rise of 
religious fundamentalism and the emergence of network types of organization 
contribute to further acceleration of identization processes. “Girotondi della liberta” in 
Berlusconi’s Italy and radical re-evaluation of cosmopolitanism as a family of images 
of representation are cases of emergent identizations with unclear but potentially 
critical political implications. 
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1.  Identizing in network societies 
 
Who are we when we are who we are? Who will we be when we are who we want to 
be? Do we want to be what we grew wanting to become? Are we certain of rules we 
have to follow to play our social roles? The roles of students, teachers, experts, 
legislators, administrators, managers, citizens, politicians, parents, employers, 
employees, producers, consumers, fans, viewers, listeners or believers, chat-room 
visitors or participants in a scientific conference? With whom, against whom do we 
negotiate borders of our identities? Individual and collective identities, which had 
once appeared as solid embeddings of decisions, intentions and beliefs, have been 
undermined in the course of the 20th century. Nationhood became ambiguous. Calling 
myself a patriot I have to embrace not only a proud tradition of ages-long struggle 
against foreign yoke and domestic oppression, but to relate to a dubious legacy of 
chauvinism, xenophobia and national socialism. Parenthood is being challenged. 
Patronizing benevolence towards children can be interpreted not only as an expression 
of a family partnership, but also as an authoritarian coercion of dependents, an 
example of a deadly dictatorship of the cousins (as Malinowski used to call it). 
Citizenship requires re-engineering in an era of mass migrations and 
“Verfassungspatriotismus”. Democracy does not stop at the factory door. 
Employment contracts get individualized. Collective agreements become undermined 
by benefits cafeterias, where employees shop for unique combination of 
psychological contract and quality of working life. Bureaucracies become undermined 
by higher education and mobility of employees, and by leaner, more flexible 
organizational forms against which they have to compete and which they have to 
emulate. Civil societies becomes diversified, solid trenches of class warfare, political 
parties and trade unions are being abandoned for inventive campaigns geared to 
market ideas, new problems with immigrants cut across class lines.  Last not least, 
exercising their freedom to forge elective affinities at the expense of the traditional 
ones - individuals float in multiple blind dates in virtual chat-rooms, online 
communities, communication networks and increasing uncertainty.  
 
Social scientists spoke of multiple and fluid identities, of an identity crisis, of 
generation gaps, of gender wars, of nomads of the present (Melucci). Human 
individuals and social groups were supposed to switch, flow, drift, change, reject 
permanent identification, re-model and re-engineer revivals and rejuvenations (“born 
again Christians” or “re-engineered Muslims” are a case in point, and so is a growing 
number of divorces). Sociologists, psychologists and philosophers spoke of the new 
individualists, of lonely crowds, of experience economy and of society of a spectacle. 
They accounted for a loss of stable identities by saying that “all that was solid melted 
into thin air”, by complaining of “the corrosion of character”, by mourning the 
phenomenon of “bowling alone” and “the collapse of the American community”. 
Moreover, they often found out that identifying and self-identifying of an individual 
or of a group has been intertwined with power struggles, economic conflicts and 
ideological disputes. 
 
Metaphors, words and concepts we still live by make it difficult to distinguish a fluid 
process underneath a temporary freeze-frame of an identity, to detect a verb and a 
gerund under a noun and a name. However, we have slowly and gradually become 
aware that our personalities are in fact parliaments of selves, where numerous parties 
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Likewise, even the strongest collective emotional experiences of national or religious 
fervour have repeatedly been deconstructed as “imagined communities” (Anderson, 
1991), as artificial as those with lesser emotional appeal, and as man-made as 
arbitrary conventions about playing rugby (Varnedoe, 1989) or settling a dispute in 
court (Cohen, 2002).  
 
Let us take an example of a political identity of a modern nation-state and derived 
identities of its citizens. This product of European historical development became a 
globally accepted political identity for internationally active and politically emergent 
“collectives” and has been recognized by the United Nations Organization (which is, 
in fact, an Organization of United Nation-States, since nations deprived of a state are 
not represented). However, even more important was a tacit recognition of a nation-
state as a dominant form of political organization by the newly emerging postcolonial 
states in the 1960ies. The acceptance of the European model of a nation-state as a 
dominant form of political organization of a local decolonised society was determined 
by emergent elites in African, South American or Asian countries. Why had they 
chosen this political form in spite of its European (i.e. linked to a former colonial 
power) origins? Had they studied in Johannesburg, San Paulo, Kanton Istambul or 
Cairo instead of at the Oxford, Sorbonne, Harvard, Madrid, Coimbra, Leiden or 
Berlin, their choice or rejection of nation-state could have been an issue for a broad 
social consultation and not a tacitly accepted fait accompli. The only respectable 
identity representatives of native counter-elites could imagine at the successful end of 
their liberation from colonial domination was that of a government of a sovereign 
nation-state with a flag, a national anthem, a currency, a football team and a place in 
the United Nations General Assembly. It was the only political identity, which had 
very clear, internationally compatible, easily recognizable, forms of organizing, 
managing, governance.   
 
It took half a century for the African political and intellectual elites to come to terms 
with the critique of a mixed legacy of their struggle for independence and with tacit 
acceptance of the European model of a nation-state imposed on a collection of tribal 
and religious communities emerging from under the colonial rule. Only now, after a 
collapse of state socialism as an alternative to a capitalist market linked to a 
parliamentary democracy, do African political thinkers ask the questions about 
cultural and political ideologies determining identities in postcolonial societies: 
 
“We are now in a position to answer the question: what would democratisation have 
entailed in the African context? It would have entailed the deracialization of civil 
power and the detribalisation of customary power, as starting points of an overall 
democratisation that would transcend the legacy of bifurcated power. A consistent 
democratisation would have required dismantling and reorganizing the local state, the 
array of Native Authorities organized around the principle of fusion of power, 
fortified by an administratively driven customary justice and nourished through extra-
economic coercion.”(Mamdani,1996,24-25)  
 
This is the path not taken. Mugabe’s recent removal of white farmers is a token 
gesture of political reform, but it certainly does not reinforce democratic process in 
Zimbabwe. New black owners of the farms will find themselves as much at the mercy 
of uncontrolled state bureaucracy in a lawless state as their white predecessors. The 
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state has not been immediately clear to the black power elites. This should come as no 
surprise. It is only natural considering that for a century and a half it was not very 
clear to the leaders of working class movements in Europe either. The latter also 
focussed on getting hold of a nation-state either by parliamentary (social democrats) 
or revolutionary (communists) means. Less attention was devoted to the maintenance 
of trade union or party democracy and their translation into a state policy reinforcing 
civil society. Emergent political elites in the third world countries followed the same 
route. National liberation movements focussed on overthrowing colonial rule and 
taking a colonial state over. An exchange of a ruling elite from a foreign to a native 
one was tacitly expected to be beneficial to the masses of colonially exploited 
populations. No further development of civil society was stimulated. The mistake of 
counter-elites was easy to make: European trade-union and communist-party activists 
(whose class struggle was often compared to the anti-colonial resistance) also 
believed that at the end of their class struggles they will replace the capitalist middle 
class professionals (serving the interests of capitalists) with socialist state 
functionaries (serving interests of the working class). More anarchistic or democratic 
alternatives have never been seriously considered as sustainable forms of social 
organization.(1)  
 
Using Melucci’s term, we may say that collective identizing in newly liberated former 
colonies was a self-conscious application of a dominant political form. It displayed a 
certain organized blindness and amnesia vis a vis local cultural resources as a source 
of possible alternatives to a simple exchange of power between a former (“white”) 
power elite and a new one (“black”). The new elites failed to identify political, 
cultural or social alternatives to dominant forms of political and economic organizing. 
By doing so, they narrowed down the scope of potential choices and excluded some 
paths identization could take. We understand why they did so (because they took a 
dominant form of political identity), but in order to answer the “how” question, one 
would have to reconstruct political history of all postcolonial nation-states in order to 
explain competitive advantage of some identizations over the others. There are some 
isolated attempts, including the one by Michael Burawoy, who watched how: 
 
“Zambian “successors” were denied the resources and authority of their expatriate 
predecessors and how these were in turn promoted into newly created positions to 
“oversee” Zambianization. It turned into a study of the reproduction of the colour bar, 
the principle that no black should have white subordinate. Given that the first goal of 
the postcolonial Zambian government was to eliminate racial injustice, how was it, I 
asked, that the colour bar persisted? I extended out from the racial dynamics of the 
workplace to the economic and political interests of Zambian workers, multinational 
capital, the new governing class, and expatriate management. I showed how the 
configuration of class forces, inherited from colonialism, held the racial order in 
place.”(Burawoy, 2000, 21-22)    
 
Some alternative forms have been half-heartedly tried – for instance a short-lived 
Arab federation of Syria and Egypt (1958-1971) can be seen as an attempt to forge a 
political and economic organization based on a religious identity of predominantly 
Muslim Syrians and Egyptians in Northern Africa and in the Middle East. In 1972 
Libya entered the federation, but backed off in 1974 and the whole federation 
collapsed splitting into original nation-states. United Arab Emirates – a union of 
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relatively homogeneous entities are involved. Yugoslavia existed from 1919 to 1990, 
but it dissolved in a bloody civil war. French, Spanish and Polish anarcho-syndicalism 
(of which only the Spanish one was partially implemented during the short-lived 
Republic and Spanish civil war in the mid-1930ies) are cases in point of imagined 
alternatives to a socialist nation state between two world wars. None of them offered a 
sustainable alternative to a political form of a parliamentary democracy within a 
nation state and to a globally integrated capitalist market economy. All of them, 
however, were conceived as attempts to remedy the “iron laws of oligarchy” and loss 
of democracy in working class organizations – primarily political parties and trade 
unions. All of them have been suppressed due to the political context in which 
identization took place. 
 
 
2. Political context of identizing 
 
Political context of identizing processes plays a very important role in determining 
choices of individuals, movements and societies. Some outcomes are dependent on 
the institutional context; the abovementioned anarcho-syndicalist alternative lost to a 
less democratic alternative (a bureaucratic communist party or a trade union) because 
of a failure to survive as an organizational alternative to bureaucracy (dictatorship of 
the proletariat had no future but was originally robust enough to withstand external 
pressure by total mobilization and large-scale terror). Likewise, new forms of a 
democratic state based on local democratic process (which might have emerged in the 
decolonising world, but failed to do so) lost to an European bureaucratic nation-state 
because of a lack of international support for alternative organizational forms 
(recognition of a Palestinian Authority by the United Nations is an exception to the 
rule, though it is clearly no match for Israel as a nation-state, which has more 
discretion in selecting allies, ignoring United Nations and implementing military 
policies). Some outcomes are dependent on a cultural climate. On a spur of the 
moment communities may disregard potentially more promising alternatives, because 
they run against political emotions. Mugabe’s policy of abolishing colour bar in land 
ownership might be more successful if linked to a long-term plan of a gradual transfer 
of know-how and management to black shadow farmers – but this would require a 
compromising attitude towards white land owners (which would be less popular than 
a straightforward eviction). This collective failure of political imagination cannot be 
remedied by a desperate cri du coeur of the French student rebels of 1968 – 
“imagination au pouvoir”. In order to help imagination become a powerful force, 
political identization has to be managed. In 1968 the Old Left (the communist parties) 
kept the institutions (party machines) – in spite of the death of their ideology 
(revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist world order). Everybody saw the 
communist future (imperialist policies of totalitarian Soviet state) and everybody 
knew that it did not work. The New Left (protest movements) kept “imagination” – 
i.e. designed new identity for the left, but failed to sustain imagination’s long march 
through the institutions (in spite of the fact that individual representatives of 1968 did 
make careers in bureaucracies – Joshka Fischer, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Tom Hayden, 
Regis Debray are cases in point).  
 
The events of 1968 had little immediate effect on global institutional order of nation-
states. However, they marked a decisive break with an ideological Iron Curtain. 
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read Che Guevara, Mao Dze Dong or Trotsky instead of Montesquieu, Weber or 
Rawls. Young Polish, Hungarian or Czech students did the reverse. They read 
Adorno, Rawls and Marcuse instead of Marx, Mao or Che. An American student 
occupying offices of the Columbia University in New York City called his parents to 
ask what Lenin was doing in Smolny palace during the October revolution… 
Identization is not an orderly, totally rational process and revolutionaries may either 
envision the future or fall back on the past traditions. It has happened before. French 
revolutionaries of 1789 often saw themselves as true descendants of republican Rome. 
They felt they were resuscitating Roman virtues and not serving as simple 
gravediggers of the monarchy and pioneers of uncertain future. Future was bright – as 
statues to Reason erected at the time (and Roman themes in female fashions) clearly 
indicate.  
 
Identization is also considerably influenced by “the industrialization of representation 
in the modern era”(Ray, 2001,180), which means that any potential young radical had 
been already submerged in the constant flow of televised images before constructing a 
revolutionary identity of his or her own. Thus new generations of “rebels” could 
model themselves on the most distant and exotic revolutionaries. Fanon had only 
Marx and printed word when designing a political identity for the “wretched” of the 
earth, i.e. for the third world. Zapatistas had the resources of the Internet, mobile 
phones and political show in  mass media. They could appeal to virtual communities. 
In their case imitation of revolutionary models was a case of counterculture. A 
counterculture is a generator of truly imagined communities (idealized, often 
venerated with political pilgrimages to Havana or Beijing). Sharing a subculture of 
social protest and political struggle against “establishments” one facilitates 
identization processes: 
 
“Culture… engenders new classes and recruits members for them, creating a world in 
which community consists less in topographical proximity than in shared interests, 
expertise and values.”(ibid., 181) 
 
Social processes of identizing became accelerated already in the classical changes of 
European modernity. They were linked by historically earlier mass media – books, 
periodicals, written letters (“cahiers des doleances”) and manifestos.  Protestant 
rebellions, industrial revolution, colonial expansion – all had contributed to this 
acceleration of identizing among broadly distributed groups. Protestants had to forge a 
separate Christian identity – that of believers inspired by the Bible but regulating their 
religious life without the Roman Catholic hierarchy of priests and bishops. They have 
tied the Bible to a native vernacular thus reinforcing nation-state as a framework of 
religious organization. The industrialists had to strip peasants of agricultural resources 
and make them flock to urban centers – where they acquired class identities of their 
own (for instance – a proletarian or a middle class one). Both lower class proletarians 
and middle class professionals have been strengthening the nation-state, which 
regulated their class struggle at a national, usually political level (British labour 
legislation, Bismarck’s “welfare state” laws, French class warfare of the Commune). 
Colonial conquests made Europeans assume “white man’s burden” - i.e. an ideology 
of a natural superiority of Western European culture, social organization and 
technology to any other culture, social organization and technology – any place, any 
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colonial policy of  their own) acquired a new twist.  
 
When costs of maintaining the colonies (in the wake of WWII) became too high, 
colonial domination had been replaced with politically correct acknowledgement of 
national liberation movements (sometimes very late as was the case with Dutch dirty 
war in Indonesia in 1947 and Franco-British attempt to occupy Suez canal in 1956). 
New windows of opportunity for maintaining the inequalities of a global world 
system have developed, making it virtually impossible for former colonies to improve 
their economic, political and cultural status (cf. Wallerstein, 1995, Hopkins, 
Wallerstein, 1996, Said, 1993). Et plus ça change…? No. History does not repeat 
itself. Identization processes acquired new dynamics, and maintenance of global 
domination in the interests of a relatively limited number of power elites in the 
strongest nation states becomes increasingly difficult, because of the growing 
transparence of all processes, including the identization ones, in the media-
saturated, networked society.  
 
The above difficulty in maintaining ideological control in order to justify persistent 
inequalities was demonstrated not only in the streets of Seattle or Genoa, where 
hundreds of grass-roots organizations had converged in order to stage a spectacular 
protest action reported in most of the world’s media. It could also be traced in a 
relentless criticism of those intellectuals, who are being perceived as representing the 
point of view of the privileged elites. There is hardly any world top conference 
involving representatives of international organizations and national governments 
without a counter-conference, a wave of protests or at least an attempt at an 
alternative approach towards global governance. On August 31 – September 4, 2002, 
the 2
nd European conference of People’s Global Action (PGA) network has met in 
Leiden, the Netherlands, to discuss joint actions of various groups, movements and 
NGO’s, which came together in Seattle, Washington, Genoa and Prague, protesting 
against globalization and designing a strategy of opposing “the destruction of 
humanity and of the planet by a global market”. This is clearly one of early attempts 
to create an alternative to the present world order and to oppose curbing of citizens’ 
liberties under the pretext of war against terrorism. Needless to say, the conference is 
ignored by mass media – television, newspapers, radio and periodicals. It is thus also 
an attempt to give voice to those, who have been invisible in the media. A critique of 
V.S. Naipaul, an accomplished British writer (born in an Indian family in Jamaica and 
honoured with a Nobel prize in literature) by a Palestinian intellectual living in New 
York, Edward Said, is a case in point: 
 
“Naipaul is the perfect witness for The New York Review of Books, where he can 
be counted on to survey the Third World (with scarcely any other third World 
testimony to challenge him), its follies, its corruption, its hideous problems. To 
say that Naipaul resembles scavenger, then, is to say that he now prefers to render 
the ruins and derelictions of postcolonial history without tenderness, (…) He 
prefers to indict guerrillas for their pretensions rather than indict the imperialism 
and social injustice that drove them to insurrection, he attacks Muslims for the 
wealth of some of their number and for a vague history of African slave trading, 
thus putting aside many centuries of majority struggle and complex civilization; 
he sees in today’s Third World only counterfeits of the First World, never such 
things as apartheid or the wholesale American devastation of Indochina.(…) He 
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is a creative reflection upon a devastating lack of historical preparation, upon the 
anguish of whole countries and people unable to cope”.”(Said, 2000, 100-101) 
 
Political context of identizing is changing and dominant position of the present 
establishments cannot be taken for granted, since multicultural global interactions 
breed attempts at the articulation and presentation of too many emergent identities to 
contain and control them. More specifically, multicultural global interactions 
contribute to the detraditionalization of identization processes, making hybrid and 
improvised identities acceptable for growing segments of the population. Increasingly 
frequent attempts to rejuvenate “norms and values” debates in European societies are 




3.  Identizing and detraditionalizing 
 
Najpaul is important not only as an object of a critique for becoming a literary 
representative of colonial powers and benchmarking third world’s postcolonial 
identities to the first world’s colonial ones. He is also important as one of the early 
critics of a Muslim fundamentalism. He was one of the first observers to note that the 
fundamentalist revival, contrary to appearances, is not a traditionalist come-back, but 
a postmodern sociotechnical invention, a politicised and rejuvenated, reconstructed 
religious ideology employed by social movements of alternative modernization. He 
has noticed, in other words, that in spite of an appearance of re-traditionalization, 
Islamic fundamentalism is an instrument of de-traditionalization for broad segments 
of the population (both middle and lower class ones). As the author of two journeys 
around the Arab and non-Arab countries of Islam (cf. Naipaul,1982,1999) he is 
frequently quoted by journalists (cf. an interview with him conducted in August 2002 
by Tobias Döring and Hubert Spiegel for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) when 
warning against global ambitions of Islamic fundamentalists, especially the Saudis. 
The question, which merits an answer, is why can fundamentalisms be winning so 
many followers in spite of their clearly unattractive side effects (terrorist attacks, 
primitive dictatorships, oppressive regimes)(2)? Before answering this question let us 
note that the same could be asked about roots of popularity of German nazism and 
Italian fascism or Soviet and Chinese communism. Why was German Nazism so 
psychologically attractive to a majority of German population, especially in the early 
thirties? Why was Soviet communism genuinely supported - even by the very victims 
of Stalinist terror? In both cases relative a stability of Hitler’s or Stalin’s regimes 
resulted from a mix of mass terror (preventive destruction of possible future counter-
elites) and mass propaganda providing ubiquitous imagery of the only identity 
allowed by the ruling party. One could either become a devoted nazi or communist – 
or nobody at all (other identities were either absent from public spaces or vilified). 
But this simplistic propaganda could not be successful without appeal to the target 
populations. This appeal was linked, in all cases, to the promise of detraditionalization 
(becoming a nazi or a communist meant one was being modern). This propaganda 
onslaught went hand in hand with a destruction of privacy (privacy being a traditional 
escape from the call of historic duty). State monopoly on identization meant that no 
alternative identity of – let us say – a political opposition member, or a member of a 
non-communist detraditionalization policy – could emerge, be expressed and 
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to lure true nazis and communists to the alternative form of modernization – a liberal 
and democratic one with an US American flavour. 
 
Causes of popularity of Islamic fundamentalist populism (which follows a communist 
and fascist ones as a non-capitalist alternative to modernization’s threats to stability of 
rapidly modernized societies) can be thus found in a loss or a crisis of most 
institutions supporting social identization and compromised by their link to traditional 
centres of power and influence in the Islamic countries. What are these institutions, 
whose crisis new fundamentalists are exploiting?   
 
The present crisis of these institutions has already been announced by their high-
jacking by the nazi and soviet political elites. Political parties, trade unions, 
established churches and whole nation-states in totalitarian states of nazis or 
communists have been mere transmission belts of orders issued in a single controlling 
centre of the ruling party. In liberal democracies they have not been undermined so 
thoroughly, but they were subjected to the managerial controls and PR and marketing 
techniques imported from market companies. All of these institutions, which are still 
based on an assumption of a continuity of a social identity, exist in democratic 
societies of the early 21st century, but they undergo a systemic crisis, because their 
constituencies become flexible and temporary. They cannot cope with internal 
differentiation and flexible response to changing expectations of individualized 
citizens, members, generation cohorts, religious believers, followers of radical 
movements (ecological, feminist), etc. They cannot adapt new socialization 
procedures, while the old ones loose their significance. For an increasingly mobile 
population, identization becomes a difficult exercise of a duty of a citizen, often 
neglected, underestimated and beyond social control. Loss of social control is often 
perceived as a relative loss of civic virtues, but rarely remedied by direct educational, 
political and cultural action. Why is a response to this challenge so slow in coming 
about? One of the reasons can be found in individualized mobility of members of 
contemporary societies. Only fifty years ago, once a baby was baptized – he or she 
became a member of a church. Only twenty-five years ago, once a student graduated 
from a university, he or she became a member of a profession entering a company or 
an institution. Membership was life-long and local or professional community took 
care of observing obedience to the rules, of controlling individuals and groups. Clear-
cut expectations went with this membership (for instance – regular church attendance, 
refraining from work and shopping on Sundays, patterning of social and family life) 
and socialization was life-long (upgrading professional knowledge, running peer 
control institutions, etc.).  Likewise, once a citizen aligned his or her interests with a 
political program – he or she became a member of a political party. Parties were left 
(equality, socialism), right (liberty, liberalism) or centre (fraternity, conservatism). 
Finally, once one accepted legitimate means of increasing one’s influence in a 
workplace, one became a member of a trade union, which had procedures for fighting 
for better working conditions of large segments of industrial employees.  
 
None of these institutions flourishes in contemporary societies. Parties are too slow to 
articulate interests of quickly evolving society, where many subgroups and 
subcultures emerge and do not respond to traditional political programs. They become 
shell-parties, developing professional bureaucrats competing for state functions. Their 
program is very loosely connected with past programs of their predecessors (e.g. 
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privatisation and globalization of enterprises as eagerly as did representatives of 
traditional “right” – liberals, conservatives or Christian democrats). Trade unions 
cannot cope with a rapid differentiation of employment and with persistence of long-
term structural unemployment, have no policies in view of new technologies and do 
not know how to respond to individualization of employee contracts (who thus fall 
out of collective ones). They feel compelled to collaborate with the employers, 
owners and managers, increasing competitiveness of native economy against global 
rivals instead of trying to increase their members’ immediate material benefits. 
Churches find it difficult to retain necessary flexibility in view of new lifestyles and 
values and to relate them to the dogmatic traditions. It is, indeed, difficult to allow 
contraceptives and abortion for some members and forbid them for others, or to forbid 
them today and to recommend them tomorrow. If links to tradition lead to a dogmatic 
set of values and beliefs (as is the case with all religions of the book), 
detraditionalization itself is often highjacked as the safest return to the dogmas of the 
past in a re-invented institutional framework. 
 
Among the main causes of this difficulty for older and more authoritarian 
organizations to survive in a networked society one should thus list 
detraditionalization (before it becomes an instrument of re-dogmatization in 
service of a non-traditional bureaucracy – e.g. a communist, religious or nazi 
party). It is a dual process through which traditional institutional loci of 
identization loose attractiveness, and as a result identization takes place within 
social movements or virtual networks, some of which had been already 
subverted by the traditional and authoritarian institutions. Melucci, Castells and 
a number of other sociologists of new social movements have already mapped 
this territory for managers, educators, politicians and the media. Another factor 
responsible for the weakening of traditional authorities and institutions is an 
accelerated dissemination of new codes of information and images of 
representation, both of which facilitate identization. Weakening of traditional 
institutions of identization is a manifestation of a broader transition towards 
elective and re-engineered rather than inherited and unchanged affinities. In a 
sense, we elect our descent as much as we elect our ascent communities (for a 
distinction between ascent and descent communities and the proliferation of both 
types in contemporary societies as a result of a freedom of choice, cf. Morris, 1996).  
 
One should note, however, that these new elective affinities can assume many forms – 
some of them resembling traditional communities, for instance religious ones, and 
some transcending territorial boundaries and appealing to a global network. From this 
last point of view the case of such cultural clashes as the one surrounding Salman 
Rushdie’s “Satanic Verses” is indeed a case in point:  
 
“As a media product circulating in a global domain, The Satanic Verses precipitated a 
violent clash of values that are rooted in different traditions; and while the spatial 
barriers between these traditions have been eroded by cultural migrations and 
communication flows, the gulf of understanding remains.”(Thompson, 1996, 105)(3)  
   
In other words; the clash was about traditional, religious values – but their triggering 
by a cultural product from a different civilization would have been impossible without 
modern processes of mass migrations and global reach of mass media. The clash itself 
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global divisions of a Cold War. The fact that Iranian religious leaders expressed their 
claims in world media ignoring territorial constraints of national systems of justice 
should not have come as a surprise. Their case ran parallel to the cases of human 
rights activists encouraging citizens to express their claims in front of the European 
Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. In both cases their claims 
were on behalf of collectives (Islamic communities offended by a legally permitted 
blasphemy) or individuals (citizens of European states wronged by national legal 
systems) showing no respect for nation state’s sovereign jurisdiction, manifesting an 
adherence to a post-national and denationalised concept of citizenship (Sassen, 2002, 
288). In both cases nation states were disregarded in appeals for justice and in both 
cases they were unable to control communication flows and information codes (either 
a language of religious fundamentalism or of human rights). In the case of Salman 
Rushdie, religious fundamentalists found that the British nation-state failed to 
accommodate universal moral norms (prohibition of blasphemy), which should take 
precedence at the expense of citizen liberties (freedom of expression). In the case of 
individual European citizens claiming to have been wronged by their national systems 
of justice, lawyers try to find if individuals or groups are systematically excluded 
from due protection guaranteed by the universal declaration of human rights. In both 
cases it would have been impossible to disregard nation-state if modern technologies 
did not allow for communications and virtual community forming beyond nation 
state’s control. How are new communication flows, information codes and images of 
representation produced, disseminated and used in those and other identization 
processes in a network society?  
 
 
4.  Repertories of representation 
 
How do we go about selecting images of ourselves, and communicating them to the 
others? How can we guarantee the others’ attention to our message and our relevance 
in view of emergent values? What do we actually do when we construct our 
identities? Some of them we are socialized into very early in our lives, so that we get 
the impression of never have chosen at all. Yet we are choosing all the time. We make 
choices in words, images, codes of communication, linguistic repertories. We learn to 
“identify” ourselves not only when displaying a passport in an airport, but more 
significantly, when recognizing our interests, celebrating our values, organizing our 
projects, maintaining our links, ties and communications with the others. Individuals 
going about their business in families, workplaces and urban centres are all involved 
in identization processes, but rarely perceive them as such. Some organizations and 
communities try to visualize those identizations by ceremonies (celebrations of a 
football club victory in city centers, ritual clashes with fans of another sport club), 
uniforms or special dress (face painting and wrapping in national flags by football 
fans during international games), etc. However, in ordinary life we usually tend to 
gloss over numerous identization points we pass (for instance filling in a consumer 
questionnaire or choosing a product because of its significance in differentiating 
ourselves from the other, but also, for instance, comparing average wage level in 
various countries to decide about the level of world capitalist system into which we 
have been socialized).  
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1968 was prompted by a refusal to stay within a repertory of representations of 
student roles at the university and within society at large. Zapatistas refused to accept 
a repertory of representations, which hid the poorest peasants from the rest of the 
Mexican society. The first anti-globalization protest movements are also based on a 
refusal to stay within a repertory of representations of marginal roles on a stage 
occupied by multinational corporations and institutions of international governance. 
Political parties and their cultures were found lacking in appeal to the young 
generation. Ritualized oppositional roles were found to be lacking in breadth around 
1968 – accessible identities seemed “square”, conformist and marginalized. Cult film 
of the period – “Graduate” or “One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest” – demonstrated 
acceptance of students in adult life of a society (in this case through a romance 
between a student and a mother of his fellow-student or through a radical comparison 
of establishment with total dictatorship) and implied that the same acceptance should 
be demanded in university decision-making and in society at large. A popular protest 
movement against war in Vietnam was increasingly supported also by the working 
class, which had been bearing most of the burdens of war (as another cult film of the 
period – “Deer Hunter” – amply demonstrates).(4) Marginalization is also 
experienced by antiglobalists – Pax Americana excludes too many human societies 
from meaningful citizenship identities. Moreover, barring some extreme political 
developments (e.g. the present threat of a preventive war to be waged by the USA 
against Iraq), this exclusion is often masked by a concept of cultural relativism, which 
prevents a more thorough analysis of power relations and radical de-marginalization 
(including de-racialization): 
 
“The notion of cultural relativism transformed coloniality of power into a semantic 
problem. If we accept that actions, objects, beliefs and so on are culture-relative, we 
hide the coloniality of power from which different cultures came into being in the first 
place. The problem, then, is not to accommodate cosmpolitanism to cultural 
relativism, but to dissolve cultural relativism and to focus on the coloniality of power 
and the colonial difference produced, reproduced and maintained by global design. 
Critical cosmopolitanism and new democratic projects imply negotiating the 
coloniality of power and the colonial difference in a world controlled by global 
capitalism. Rights of man or human rights, of course, would have to be negotiated 
across gender lines (…), but also across the coloniality of power that structured and 
still structures the modern/colonial world around the racially grounded colonial 
difference.”(Mignolo, 2002, 179-180)   
 
Another example of a conscious attempt to uncover tacit assumptions about identity 
and to modify identization processes was provided by feminist movements 
questioning gender roles and identities as biased and reflecting male dominated 
society. Women refused a second rate identity and noticed that both representatives of 
establishment and of rebellious students displayed the same taught ignorance about 
gender issues. It is worth noting that in spite of a widespread belief that Islamic 
countries are much more repressive with respect to women, there have been periods in 
the late twentieth century, when three Islamic countries have been headed by female 
prime ministers and presidents, while there has been no female president of the United 
States or Russia, no female chancellor of Germany or president of France and no 
female prime minister of Japan or chairperson of Chinese Communist Party yet. 
Nevertheless, a large-scale deprofessionalization and removal from public sphere of 
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than statistics about political careers of women in Islamic vs Christian countries. 
 
Why did women decide to identify with a struggle against male domination rather 
than with a gradual adjustment to a long march through male dominated institutions? 
Why students choose images of young revolutionaries and of protesters on barricades 
instead of images of the young managerial cadres of the world’s elite marching 
through educational institutions towards power positions in the world’s strongest 
superpower (as their younger colleagues did throughout the 1980ies and 1990ies, a 
period of unprecedented growth of MBA education)? Why did women fail to buy the 
imagery of a firm gender inequality based on ultimate biological differences? Why 
did students fail to buy the imagery of a rational society in pursuit of wealth and 
happiness? Why did they fail to buy the imagery of Cold War in 1966 and not in 
1961? Why did they refuse to accept an argument about a domino effect of a potential 
communist conquest of South Vietnam? There was no protest movement when the 
president of the United States was considering a pre-emptive strike against Soviet 
missiles in Cuba (1961), although this might have been much more dangerous for 
world peace than a war in Vietnam (1965). 
 
First, a large increase in the numbers of students in mid-1960ies meant an increase in 
frequency of generational self-socialization (on a large campus rather than in a tight 
local community) and thus a radical change in a generational identization processes. 
As young generations started drifting through educational institutions, they began to 
use their newly won identities as a base for social actions. A powerful national protest 
movement against war in Vietnam was born out of a local and modest Free Speech 
Movement against turning a park into a multi-level parking at the Berkeley campus. It 
was a local trigger of a national protest movement, which, moreover, had huge echoes 
all over the world (including Paris, Mexico City, Warsaw, Amsterdam, Prague 
Frankfurt or Bolonia). Growth of universities, necessitated by modern economy and 
facilitated by relative affluence gave rise to a new social group looking for new 
identities. Students did not yet experience class struggle and did not have to serve in 
Vietnam en masse (young people from lower and less educated classes did), but they 
acted upon their identities acquired in the course of their student careers and 
reinforced during the protest movement projects and actions. They could find a 
common cause (unpopular war in Vietnam), a common denominator (young 
generation’s refusal to accept war propaganda) and a common ground (academic 
networking and media coverage). The rest was a question of time spent together and 
experience of a generational participation in the making of world history:   
   
“This is why identities are so important – because they build interests, values and 
projects, around experience, and refuse to dissolve by establishing specific 
connections between nature, history, geography and culture. Identities anchor power 
in some areas of the social structure, and build from there their resistance or their 
offensives in the informational struggle about the cultural codes constructing the 
behaviour and, thus, new institutions.”(Castells, 1997, 360) 
 
What repertories of representation do we find in contemporary societies, after the 
student protest movements (1960ies), after collapse of state socialism (1980ies) and 
after the crises of globalization and its inequalities (around 2000)? Why are populist 
and rightist politicians emerging in all European countries appealing to xenophobic 
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Slovakia, Lepper in Poland, Zirinovskij in Russia, Mugabe in Zambia)? Why can they 
tap the resources of popular “resentiment” against modernization, against open 
society and world governance, in spite of clearly insufficient alternative programs? 
 
They tap these resources, because they appeal to the suppressed religiously expressed 
traditions of universal humanity dating back to the period before the establishment of 
a nation state (after the peace of Westphalia). However, their populism consists of 
appealing to the emotions beyond the nation state’s regulations, but at the same time 
channelling them into the political struggle for power precisely in the very same 
nation states populist politicians are criticizing. Attractiveness of their appeal results 
from a much more profound inspiration of a pre-nation state debate about “the 
inclusion of the other” in the European religious, moral and political universe on the 
eve of a colonial expansion. This is what present day African and South American 
scholars deconstruct when interpreting the debates of Valdollidad of the early XVIth 
century, between Juan Gines de Sepulveda and Bartolome de las Casas “about the 
degree of humanity of Amerindians and the right of Spaniards to declare war, enslave 
Amerindians and take possession of their land and bodies”: 
 
“These inquiries circulated in Europe first in a manuscript form and later in the book 
entitled Relectio de Indis (Vitoria,1539). In published form, these inquiries were 
organized into three major issues: (1) whether Amerindians were true “owners” of 
their lands and other properties and in control of their own social organization;(2) 
whether instead the emperor and the people were “owners” and had the right to 
control both Amerindians and other non-Christian people (infidels); and (3) whether 
the “legal entitlements” were that justified (from a Spanish point of view) Spanish 
domination of Amerindians. 
 
In today’s terminology, Vitoria’s inquiry was principally concerned with the idea of 
“the inclusion of the other”. The political aspects of society and international relations 
were examined with the assumption that every human and rational being (under Greek 
and Christian parameters) has.”(Mignolo,2002, 164) 
 
It is certainly one of the most mysterious ironies of fate that appealing to the universal 
inclusion of all humans in a civilised community today’s populists in the western 
countries embrace racist prejudice against those representatives of former colonial 
nations who are currently living in their (mostly western European) urban centers of 
the former colonial powers. Algerians and Senegalese in France, Moroccans and 
Surinamese in the Netherlands, Pakistanis or Indians in Great Britain, Ethiopians in 
Italy, Angolans in Portugal or Kongolese in Belgium are cases in point. As one of the 
US Arab citizens put it; if September 11 happened in Europe, popular backlash 




5.  Clashes of cultural codes? 
 
Neither the emergence of new socio-political identities in post-colonial Africa or post-
WWII Europe, nor the emergence of a student protest movement in the late 1960ies 
lead to an establishment of sustainable identities. Post-colonial states in Africa and 
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alienating significant groups among their populations (and prompting, among others, 
immigration wave towards the western world). Radical protest movements have 
deliberately cut off past traditions of identizing offered by the “old Left” (political 
parties, trade unions) but failed to construct institutions enabling newly won identities 
to survive in a neutral or hostile institutional environment. However, none of them has 
been lost without a trace in contemporary identizing processes (although it may not 
always be immediately visible due to the enormous fragmentation of research and 
policy areas). First, African countries are being viewed by social scientists and policy 
analysts as unfinished democratisation and liberation projects, and it is far from clear 
which course they will steer in the nearest future. After all, even Mugabe is being 
challenged in spite of a very authoritarian policy of suppressing all forms of 
opposition. In other words, identizing within these countries, after a particularly 
bloody period of multiple civil wars and at the beginning of a new millenium is not a 
foregone conclusion:  
 
“The reform of indirect rule systems in post-independence Africa built on the practice 
of participation without representation. In the second phase of radical African 
governments – from Quaddafi and Sankara to early Rawlings and Museveni – this 
reform became the basis of dismantling authority in the local state without 
democratising power in the central state. (…) Participatory forms (“empowerment”) 
that stress the autonomy of a bounded group – only to undermine the possibility of an 
alliance building majority-based representation – can justify and uphold the most 
undemocratic forms of central power. One only needs to look at the experience of 
self-initiated squatter settlements in South Africa; many began with an emphasis on 
participation and ended up with a warlord.”(Mamdani, 1996,298-299) 
 
Contemporary African politicians are acutely aware of this uneasy outcome of 
identization processes.The fact that the president of the Republic of South Africa 
heads a protest demonstration of thousands of poor South Africans against the 
international conference on environmental protection testifies to an attempt to break 
with this authoritarian tradition. The conference, attended by sixty thousand delegates 
from all over the world and held in one of the most expensive city districts in the 
whole of Africa in late august 2002, is broadly perceived as insufficient to tackle the 
problem of global pollution. It is de facto ignored by the governments of the most 
industrialized countries of the world: the United States and Japan. Members of the 
European Union are less negligent, but their actions also amount to paying a lip 
service to the international agreements. Moreover, government delegates sitting in air-
conditioned conference rooms are only a stone throw away from one of the poorest 
slums of Johannesburg, where a provision of running water, sewage, electricity and 
decent housing is still a challenge defying national and international aid efforts. 
Therefore the fact that Mr Mbeki has chosen to march with the demonstrators on 
Saturday, August 31, 2002 rather than remain with the world’s delegates inside the 
“conference city”, is a very important symbolic gesture, an act within the identization 
process of modern South Africans and, more generally, with citizens of what used to 
be called “the third world”. Mr Mbeki is an official host of the official delegates of 
world governments and global governance platforms. He is also, however, an official 
head of the alternative demonstration protesting against one-sidedness and post-
colonial nature of relief efforts undertaken by official delegations. Cultural codes of 
international governance (based on nation-state grounded and postcolonially ranked 
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social movements, citizens’ initiatives, anti-globalization protests, regional 
associations, new political initiatives of African politicians. Cultural codes of the 
emergent African socio-political identities are also being forged in the same 
identization processes linked to anti-globalization movements, reflecting a mass 
protest against systematic inequalities generated by global development and social 
costs of maintaining it.  
 
For instance, the so called African renaissance movement and its mixed 
consequences, for instance in the international AIDS debate and in African countries’ 
struggle against pharmaceutical companies producing disease’s inhibitors – are a case 
in point. So are the identities forged in their student period by the present African 
leaders (e.g. president Mbeki of South African Republic, president Mugabe of Zambia 
and president Nujoma of Namibia)   
 
The post-communist states in central and eastern Europe have also left their mark on 
the European Union. During the Cold War they had exercised an ideological pressure 
on their western counterparts, facilitating development of a welfare state (as a social-
democratic or Christian-democratic alternative to the communist rule). Breakdown of 
the state socialist system signalled by the rise of the Polish “Solidarity” trade union 
movement in 1980 and completed with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 triggered a 
dismantling of the welfare state (within the framework of its “privatisation”). The 
post-communist countries emerged from communism with relatively strong trade 
union movements and their former communist parties re-emerged as social 
democratic ones. The very existence of the communist-controlled societies prior to 
1980-1989, during the Cold War, made the western European capitalism (“Rheinland” 
or “polder” model) much more corporatist and welfare state oriented than in the 
United States. Social security and welfare aspects of collective agreements between 
employee and employer’s organizations are a case in point. They still survive, but 
they are being undermined by both decreasing membership in large trade unions and 
by increasing numbers of individualized employment contracts with varied packages 
of employee benefits and insurances. At present, identizing processes within these 
countries result in a rough parity between political left and right, with a whole array of 
smaller political parties and movements trying to incorporate new identities in a 
political landscape (e.g. ecological or feminist initiatives, local citizens’ 
movements)(5).  
 
There is also another area, in which these post-communist countries are influencing 
the European Union even before their formal ascent to it. Forthcoming Polish, Czech 
or Hungarian ascension to the European Union has already triggered attempt at the 
latter’s re-design and re-engineering (cf. German foreign minister, J.Fischer’s idea of 
a federation of European states). Western European populists and liberals (brought 
together, for instance, in the present Dutch government) try to mobilize mass 
prejudice by designing a new, lower category of EU-membership (demanding, for 
instance, re-introduction of obligatory visum for citizens of new EU-member states). 
The whole European Union, which has proceeded much more swiftly along economic 
than political lines, is also being redefined vis a vis Russia and Turkey, two large 
states, which clearly aspire to membership, but whose integration would offer 
numerous difficulties. For instance, integrating Russia would have to mean integrating 
a large society with a very low average income per capita, a very weak civil society 
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of an entrenched authoritarian state. In case of Turkey, Europe is facing a dilemma of 
a NATO loyalty to an ally and an European allegiance to democratic principles and 
human rights, both of which are regularly swept aside by the Turkish power elite 
(behaviour, which is tacitly, somewhat hypocritically, accepted by the EU, since 
leaving the outcome of domestic political struggles to democratic process might mean 
victory of anti-democratic Muslim fundamentalists and loss of Turkey both as a 
reliable NATO member and as a prospective member of  the EU). 
 
Some of these difficulties emerge from different cultural codes used by these two 
countries when modernizing (based on European ones, but adopted selectively). In 
both countries armed elites took power after the breakdown of the older empire and in 
both they had preserved the authoritarian model of a state in order to achieve 
modernization without democratisation (ideology of a revolutionary state in Lenin’s 
Russia and ideology of a religiously neutral nation-state in Attatürk’s Turkey) . Again, 
as in politically changing Africa, identization processes in integrating Europe are also 
hardly predictable, even if we disregard for the time being the extreme cases of 
Russia, Turkey and Israel (all of which had formally applied for EU membership). 
Tackling the problem of radical “otherness” would require a new doctrine of an euro-
cosmopolitanism. (6)  
 
New social movements, which had started in the late 1960ies, but which continue 
through the “green” ecological initiatives, feminist and other alternative movements 
(devoted to migration, racism, autonomy and self-organization, ecology and 
conservation, militarization and repression, participative economy, sexual minorities, 
etc.) of the 1980ies and 1990ies, have recently started developing governance 
procedures in order to build up a broad platform for antiglobalist and social consulting 
initiatives (cf. the abovementioned 2
nd European Conference on People’s Global 
Action, Aug.31-Sept.4,2002 in Leiden, The Netherlands). This is paralleled by growth 
of open platforms as a flexible form of organization and coordination, e.g. by the 
European Social Consulta project, which plans an international conference on 
February 22-24, and relies on online communities.(7)  However, these new social 
movements and the growth of information and communication technologies 
(primarily the spread of the Internet and mobile phone communications) have 
influenced the cultural codes in which new identization processes are taking place. 
They have, according to some scholars, influenced the very logic of culture, thanks to 
which a global training in cultural individualization serves as a cultural code for 
personal identization and social consumption (in societies, which have started 
replacing the concept of religion with the concept of culture): 
 
“…in the modern era the logic of culture is gradually extended to encompass 
economic behaviour and the leisure practices of the social body, becoming a universal 
paradigm of identity formation and differentiation that is complicitous with, or 
parasitic upon (depending on one’s point of view), the spread of capitalism. 
Inseparable from the practices of material production and consumption that 
accompany the globalization of the marketplace, a diluted form of self-cultivation 
seeks personal distinction in the consumption and acquisition of translinguistic, 
transnational symbols. The result is a generalized economy of self-conscious identity 
formation that penetrates every corner of the globe at the level of the material 
  17practice, where it can operate the recruitment of individuals into social and economic 
norms under the guise of fostering their individuality.”(Ray, 2001,11-12)     
 
The view expressed above should be qualified: while it is indeed possible to try to 
decode cultural codes by way of detecting a “matrix code” of modernity and 
postmodernity, it can only be done ex post, by historians. We should not therefore 
avoid jumping to conclusions – for instance, that processes of contemporary 
identization are parallel to processes of economic and political globalization and 
resistance to it. Processes of identizing are linked to globalization issues, but these 
links are far from clear. On the one hand globalization broadens the repertory of 
symbolic images picked up in the local identization processes (e.g. French farmers 
burning McDonald’s), on the other accelerated identization makes globalization’s 
influence upon local situations much more visible. Globalization is a complex 
megaprocess composed of many processes in economics, politics and culture (some of 
which can be happening even if nobody is aware of them), while identization is a 
much more basic and local bunch of small and large processes, which occur 
continuously (simultaneously bottom-up and top-down), are much more intimately 
experienced by human individuals (i.e. a situation in which one identifies with some 
distant ideal but is unaware of this identification is extremely rare). Identization 
would have occurred even if globalization had never emerged, but globalization with 
its colonial and decolonising past would have been either very different or impossible 
without increasingly complex and conflicting identization processes.(8)  
 
We should also avoid an assumption that an inquiry must reveal a causal bond 
between, let us say, a globally expanding market economy, a political domination of 
parliamentary democracies and an ideological hegemony of a culture of 
individualized consumption. This is not necessarily the case - as the conflicts with 
fundamentalist religious groups (Christian militias in the USA, Al Queyda network in 
Afganistan, extreme sects assaulting subway with poisonous gas in Tokyo) clearly 
indicate. Clashes between world governance structures (WTO, IMF, WG) and anti-
globalists are also symptomatic for lack of consensus about optimising cultural, 
political and economic institutions. Moreover, individuals do not simply grow into 
patterns of socialization and do not “fall” blindly into the individualized consumption 
as a result of concentrated efforts and one-sided persuasion attempts. They are also 
quite capable of selectively detraditionalizing, that is, picking up fragments of 
traditions and leaving the others aside. They are quite capable of organizing 
themselves in flexible, often virtual networks and promoting lifestyles (and 
consumption patterns), which differ from those prevailing in a society at large.  
 
Cultural and subcultural resources are continually re-invented, rejuvenated, recycled 
and re-engineered, and all of this happens amidst political, economic and cultural 
struggle. All societies, in spite of detraditionalization, preserve some institutional 
traces of former movements, former resistance to authority and networking for 
change. Almost all known societies try to preserve their social capital by cultivating 
social bonds, links and contacts, by encouraging informal networks of trust, solidarity 
and cooperation (Melucci’s “hidden networks of belonging, of pre-existing solidarity 
networks”) and by creating platforms for these informal networks to be heard (again, 
Melucci’s term “civic listening spaces” captures the essence of this phenomenon).   
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structures, processes and agencies or platforms? Or are they expressions of 
contradictions signalling the limits of controllability and coordination in complex 
societies with virtual communicational backups? There is definitely an inflation of 
phrases indicating conflicting cultural codes: “cultural revolution, cultural evolution, 
culture shock, culture wars, cultural capital, corporate culture, counter culture, 
working-class culture, popular culture, high culture, the culture of personality, cultural 
literacy, the culture industry, multiculturalism, cultural diversity, cultural opportunity, 
cultural studies” (cf. Ray, 2001, 2) – but what does it mean? Does it mean that we are 
becoming increasingly aware of cross-cultural issues involved in designing, 
implementing and running global governance projects? Or does it mean that we are 
stumbling upon levels of complexity, emergence and risk, which surpass our 
managerial and cognitive skills and capabilities, our organizational know-how and our 
ideological resources?  Growth pains of global governance procedures or dead end 
streets of global mismanagement? In spite of a biased and one-sided coverage of 
African developments in world media, even there cautious hopes are being expressed: 
 
“What the analysis goes on to demand,(…) is the invention of a state appropriate to a 
postimperialist future. To those who prudently reply that it cannot be done, the answer 
will be that it can certainly be thought of. Cases spring to mind. It was already 
beginning to be thought of, even during the dreadful 1980s, in the projects of sixteen 
country Economic Community of West African States, and, potentially again, in those 
of the nine-country Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
launched a little later. Each set of projects supposed a gradual dismantlement of the 
nation-state legacy derived from imperialism, and the introduction of participatory 
structures within a wide regionalist framework.”(Davidson, 1992, 321-322)  
 
 Let us hope for the increasing global governance and regional integration, but let us 
focus on the obstacles in order to understand our elective affinities and identities and 
to account for them in managing our integration – regional, continental and, 
presumably, hopefully, global. 
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(1) It is quite revealing to compare the paternalistic attitude of the first European 
politicians tackling the working class problems to the words spoken by 
general Jan Smuts, South African prime minister during his Rhodes Memorial 
lectures at oxford in 1929: “The African… has largely remained a child type, 
with a child psychology and outlook. A child-like human cannot be a bad 
human, for are we not in spiritual matters bidden to be like unto little 
children? Perhaps as a direct result of this temperament the African is the only 
happy human I have come across” (Mamdani,1996,4) 
  
(2) Teaching in Cairo within the elitist MBA program run jointly by Regional 
Information Technology Institute of Egypt and Maastricht School of 
Management in the 1990ies I was surprised by a gradual re-appearance of the 
Muslim head covering by female students. All of them came from middle and 
upper classes of the Egyptian society, and in the beginning of the 1990ies all 
of them dressed in a fashionable, western way, drove western cars and spent 
their holidays in Europe or in the United States. The fact that some of them 
embraced Muslim fundamentalism in spite of belonging to the privileged class 
(and thus being able to enjoy the western consumption standards) testifies to 
the power of identization. Castells is probably right when he writes that: “the 
social roots of radical fundamentalism (of which female head gear among 
middle class women is but a faint reflection, but bloody terrorist attacks on 
tourists in Luxor is not  – S.M.) appear to derive from the combination of 
successful state-led modernization in the 1950ies and 1960ies and the failure 
of economic modernization in most Muslim countries during the 1970ies and 
1980ies, as their economies could not adopt to the new conditions of global 
competition and technological revolution in the latter period. Thus, a young 
urban population, with a high level of education as a result of the first wave of 
modernization, was frustrated in its expectations, as the economy faltered and 
new forms of cultural dependency set in.”(Castells, 1997, 18) 
 
(3) Cross-cultural clash of values illustrated by the case of Salman Rushdie’s 
allegedly blasphemous novel, “Satanic Verses”, should not obscure the fact 
that on balance, relationships between Islamic and Christian communities 
cannot be reduced to a simplified image of a backward Islam trying to drag 
progressive Christianity back to Middle Ages. One should keep in mind that: 
“just about the time Canada was briefly experimenting for the first time with a 
woman prime minister in 1993, three different Muslim countries had women 
prime ministers, and one of them had a woman leader of an opposition. Here 
were cultural silences, sins of omission. Pakistan, Turkey, and Bangladesh (all 
Muslim countries) have had women as chief executives, whereas the united 
States has had no woman president, Germany no woman chancellor, and 
Russia no woman president.”(Mazrui, 2001, 113)  
 
(4) “Apocalypse Now” by Francis Ford Coppola is another cult film on Vietnam, 
but its message is slightly less domestic and more global. Coppola 
reconstructs the Vietnam war from the perspective of an ironically criticized 
“white man’s burden”, that is from the point of Conrad’s long short story 
  20“Heart of Darkness”. He sees in this war another episode in colonial tradition 
of the West. 
 
(5) Let us keep in mind that this accelerated identization (individuals have to 
define themselves within a dynamically changing political landscape with 
parties disappearing and emerging all the time) takes place in the context of a 
post-communist awareness of a peripheral position compared to Western 
Europe (a resentiment close to the postcolonial resentiments in Africa) – 
succinctly expressed the situation of these countries in the following way: 
“After a century of revolts against peripheral backwardness, after several, 
though different types of, revolutions and four decades of desperate 
experiment, in the end always ended up where they started. After its long 
detour, Central and Eastern Europe was still languishing on the periphery of 
Europe.”(Berend,1998,xvi)    
 
(6) Historical analogies are often misleading. Nevertheless, one wonders what 
would provide a present day equivalent of a correctional doctrine of papacy to 
match the 16th century situation in which “the religion-state (as opposed to a 
later nation-state ideologically introduced by Kant and the Enlightenment – 
S.M.) became instrumental as a replacement for the emperor and the pope in 
international relations, and in which a Christian cosmopolitanism was 
advanced as a correction of the Castillian crown’s global designs”(Mignolo, 
2002, 167). This argument, in turn, ties in with an argument often voiced in 
modern Christian debates about the self-secularization of the European 
Christianity: “Will the concept of the course of history as driven towards 
emancipation by diminishing strong structures (in thought, individual 
consciousness, political power, social relations, and religion) not be a 
transcription of the Christian message… of the dissolution of Western 
metaphysics?”(Vattimo, 2002, 91) 
 
(7) In a manifesto of an European Social Consulta we read: “If other worlds are 
possible, we should take initiative at their construction. We need ambitious, 
strategic, and long-term projects that make collective mobilization possible. 
We need projects that focus on the local, and which allow to connect day-to-
day issues with global struggles. We should move forward from an informed 
position and from active social debate, from collective participation and 
mobilization, from convergence and diversity of our groups and social 
movements. In opposition to the Europe of capital we should construct the 
Europe of the peoples. In opposition to a collective “dumbing down” we 
should spread popular culture and education.(…) The ESC is an experimental 
ship for social transformation. It is an utopian project that emerges from the 
margins of information society in order to produce cracks in “Fortress 
Europe””. (cf. http://www.consultaeuropea.org) The movement was born in 
Spain – in Barcelona and Madrid (Catalanian Polytechnic that runs the server 
carrying this network organization’s website) 
 
(8)  Identization processes involve - by definition - self-scrutiny, which 
globalizing agencies can avoid or postpone. However, with the increasing 
transparency of global activities the identization processes cannot remain 
uninfluenced. The recent emergence of a right-wing identization of the USA 
  21as the sole superpower entitled to wage multiple preventive wars without 
considering either allies, international governance bodies (blatant disregard of 
the United Nations) or third parties (Arab league countries) is an interesting 
example of a merger of globalizing and identizing processes in political 
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